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Is  metaphysics  essentially  an  investigation  from  the  armchair?  An  exercise  characteristic  of 
armchair philosophy is analysis. The philosopher takes a term 'F' she is interested in and enquires 
into the necessary and sufficient conditions for something being an F. In a series of articles Frank 
Jackson argues that such analysis does play an essential role in metaphysics.
This essay evaluates his argument. In the first section, I reconstruct Jackson's inference from 
what constitutes serious metaphysics to the essential role of analysis. Section 2 presents obvious 
objections to this argument which cause Jackson to elaborate a two-dimensional descriptivism of 
natural kind terms.
This, however, leads straight into a dilemma, or so I argue (3). The final section bolsters my 
refusal of Jackson's argument by identifying a valid and less controversial alternative.
1. Why serious metaphysics would be committed to analysis
Jackson starts from the assumption that metaphysical theorising is only serious if it  attempts to 
explain  everything  in  a  restricted  basic  language  [Jackson,  1994,  25].  Therefore,  a  serious 
metaphysical theory T would be equivalent to a global supervenience claim
superT:  Any world whose description in terms of  T is identical to  T's description of the actual  
world is a duplicate simpliciter of the actual world.
superT holds if and only if at any world where T is true, any true sentence not in T's basic language 
is also true. Assuming, for example, that T contains
1. NaCl contains 1.8% iodine ,
superT implies that
2. Salt contains 1.8% iodine.
is true at all worlds where T is true. In other words, superT presupposes that T entails (2). Hence, T, 
being  equivalent  to  superT,  has  to  account  for  the  fact  described  by (2)  to  become one  of  its 
theorems (26).  In Jackson's  terms,  'entry by entailment'  is  the only solution for this  'placement 
problem'.
The  entailment  at  issue,  however,  must  transcend  metaphysical  entailment  according  to 
which p entails q iff at any world where p is true, q is true. This cannot vindicate T because superT 
already implies that at any world where (1) is true, (2) is also true. Therefore, citing metaphysical 
entailment in support of T would beg the question. Additionally, metaphysical entailment would fail 
to elucidate how one arrives from (1) at (2). To cross this explanatory gap, the metaphysicist better 
add some reasoning. Surely, assuming
3. Salt is NaCl.
the  step  from (1)  to  (2)  is  a  plain  Leibniz  substitution.  Nonetheless,  Jackson  denies  that  this 
straightforward deduction solves placement problems.
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Deviating  from  Kripke's  original  distinction  between  epistemological  and  metaphysical 
necessity [Kripke, 1980, 35 - 37] Jackson contends that (3) and
4. NaCl is NaCl.
express the same necessity but  differ  in  how this  necessity can be known [Jackson,  1994, 34]
[Jackson, 1998a, 77]. Whereas (3) is necessary merely a posteriori, (4) is an a priori necessity .
Based on this epistemological understanding of necessity Jackson gives a stronger notion of 
entailment which he thinks is necessary to fill the explanatory gap between (1) and (2):  a priori 
entailment.  Although metaphysical  entailment  ┌ p╟ q┐ guarantees  a  conditional  ┌ p → q┐ to  be 
necessary, this necessity would be merely a posteriori. p a priori entails q, however, not only if p is 
true in all worlds where  q is true, but also  ┌ p → q┐ must be an  a priori necessity. To solve her 
placement problem, accordingly, the metaphysicist has to maintain an a priori necessary conditional 
with (2) in the consequent and (1) in the antecedent. Because (3) is a posteriori, the above deduction 
does not suffice for this.
Now, analysis enters the stage. According to Jackson [Jackson, 1998a, 80 - 82], it provides a 
priori knowledge of 
3'. Salt is the actually salty stuff
Additionally, for the sake of the argument, T contains
4'. NaCl is the actually salty stuff
Since (1), (3') and (4') entail (4), analysis renders '(1) ^ (40) → (43)' an a priori necessity. Thus, (3), 
although being an a posteriori truth, is derived a priori from (1) and (4'). Therefore, given the above 
deduction and the logical truth of transitivity '(1) ^ (40) → (2)' becomes an a priori necessity itself. 
Hence, analysis allows the metaphysicist to demonstrate that (1) does indeed a priori entail (2).
In sum, Jackson argues that serious metaphysics brings with it placement problems which 
cannot be solved but by identifying entailment relations. As this entailment needs to be a priori, and 
only  analysis  provides  the  required  a  priori knowledge,  analysis  plays  an  essential  role  in 
metaphysics.
2. Two-dimensional descriptivism of natural kind terms
Jackson's crucial assumption is that analysis provides the required a priori knowledge of (3'). Taking 
a step back, though, this seems little plausible[Harman, 1994, 43]. The paradigm of a priority, as 
Harman points out, is our knowledge of logical truths. Whereas this, however, can be achieved by 
mere deduction, analysis relies on induction in two respects. First, the philosopher generalises from 
various judgements to the unique intuition about a possible case. Second, she infers from a small 
number of cases a definition which is supposed to hold generally. This epistemic difference already 
requires Jackson to specify what he means by 'a priori'. The various objections raised against the 
analytic-synthetic-distinction also cast doubt on whether the analysis  of concepts yields  a priori 
knowledge.  Therefore,  in  order  to  render  '(1)  → (2)'  a  priori  Jackson  needs  to  elaborate  the 
traditional conception of 'a priori'.
This  is  even  more  so  as  Jackson's  champions  analysis  of  natural  kind  terms.  Thus, 
knowledge of (3') being  a priori demands the subject to know the reference of 'salt'  merely by 
means of her linguistic competence. If so, 'salt' would refer to whatever is the white, powdery stuff 
which is present in sea-water and is used to flavour and preserve food. More generally, the reference 
of a natural kind term 'F' would be determined by which properties a speaker associated with it. 
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This, however, amounts to a descriptivist theory of reference. Hence, Jackson's assumption holds 
only if such descriptivism holds. The well known externalist cases studies, however, have swept 
away traditional descriptivism by showing that the reference of 'F'  is independent of whichever 
descriptions speakers associate.
Against this obstacle Jackson applies considerable effort, by developing a two-dimensional 
approach  to  natural  kind  terms  [Jackson,  1994,  39],  [Jackson,  1998a,  46].  Two-dimensional 
semantics is  the approach of disambiguating traditional conceptions of semantic value into two 
different  aspects.  With  Jackson,  the  difference  is  drawn between  two  types  of  functions  from 
possible worlds into extensions, C- and A-intensions. This distinction is based on two different ways
to think of possible worlds [Jackson, 1998a, 47]. From the first stance a natural kind term 'F' is used 
at the actual world @ to talk about another world  w, and thus has the same extension at any  w, 
namely whatever is an  F at @. In this sense, 'salt' refers to  NaCl even at Twin Earth. From the 
second point of view, however, 'F' is used as if w would be the actual world. Then, 'salt' refers to 
AbCd, but again at all worlds, considered as counterfactual. The A-intension, now, takes this latter 
stance  and maps  actual  worlds  to  extensions,  whereas  the  C-intension  distinguishes  one  actual 
world and gives the according extension for counterfactual worlds. This is crisply represented in 
tables, as it is done for 'salt' in table 1.
Jackson exploits this framework to revive a descriptivist theory of reference for natural kind terms 
`F '. He admits that its C-extension is not determined by a description. 'Salt', as used at @ talking 
about  w, refers to  NaCl although  AbCd is the salty stuff at  w. Nonetheless, he claims that the  A-
intension  of  'salt'  corresponds  to  a  rigidified  definite  description  [Jackson,  1994,  39],  that  is  a 
conjunction of stereotypical features ('salty') a sortal ('stuff'), a uniqueness clause ('the') enhanced 
by an operator which species the actual world ('actually'): Salt is the actually salty stuff.
Based on this semantics Jackson elaborates the epistemology of analysis. Whereas linguistic 
competence alone does not suffice to provide knowledge of its C-intension, as the externalist cases 
reveal,  mere  reflexion  about  one's  implicit  conceptual  understanding  of  F,  he  claims,  gives 
knowledge of its  A-intension. A speaker of English may not know that salt is  NaCl, or a Twin-
Earthling that what he calls 'salt' is AbCd. However, or so Jackson presumes, both know that salt is 
the  salty  stuff  of  their  respective  acquaintance,  know that  rigidified  definite  description  which 
makes up the  A-intension. Since this knowledge is acquired as soon as the English respectively 
Twin-English  word  'salt'  is  understood,  it  does  not  depend  on  which  world  is  the  actual.  For 
Jackson,  this  circumstance  is  sufficient  for  knowledge  of  a  term's  A-intension  to  be  a  priori 
[Jackson, 1998a, 50]. Thus, analysis would indeed yield a priori knowledge, could solve placement 
problems and therefore play an essential role for serious metaphysics. This result, however, stands 
or falls on the presumption that for any natural kind term, any speaker has a priori knowledge of a 
rigidified definite description which makes up the term's  A-intension. In the next section I show 
how contentious this assumptions is.
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3. Two-dimensional descriptivism is controversial
To establish analysis as the only cure against placement problems, Jackson has developed a two-
dimensional descriptivist semantics of natural kind terms. Traditional descriptivism was defeated by 
counterexamples.  The fatal  weakness of Jackson's  argument is  that  against  his  two-dimensional 
descriptivism,  too,  counterexamples  can  be  construed.  They  show  that  any  constituent  of  the 
definite description, be it the uniqueness clause, the sortal or one of the stereotypical features, is 
revisable in view of empirical findings. Any adjustment to save a priori knowledge of A-intensions, 
it is demonstrated, either weakens the description to triviality or, as Laura Schroeter puts it, credits 
'[...] us with a more accurate understanding of the reference of our concepts than we seem to have' 
[Schroeter, 2004, 432].
First, that natural kind terms are not a priori linked to stereotypical properties is suggested 
by cases found in [Block & Stalnaker, 1999, 432]. Laurence and Margolis [Laurence & Margolis, 
2003, 261-263]  explicitly tie  up with Putnam's  argument  against  a  descriptivism of  kind terms 
[Putnam, 1970,  187-190].  They point  out  that  to  command the  term 'salt'  does  not  presuppose 
knowledge of salt being liquid, clear or having anyone of the properties commonly associated with 
it as these are contingent facts about our world. In some passages [Jackson, 1994, 39],[Jackson, 
1998b, 241], Jackson anticipates this objection and allows deviant cases as long as enough of the 
stereotypes are fulfilled; however, he fails to specify and justify the limit. Presumably, he would 
have to allow extreme deviations. In fact, as Block and Stalnaker point out, nothing guarantees that 
any stereotype is fulfilled at all. Effectively, he is compelled to trivialise speakers' knowledge of 
how salt is like.
Second, Schroeter [Schroeter, 2004, 439] points out that Aristotle thought of salt as one of 
the four basic configurations of prime matter. Today, chemical inquest has revealed that salt is a 
chemical kind, accordingly speakers associate a different sortal. Apparently, speakers do not have 
an infallible understanding and therefore no a priori knowledge of the sortals which are part of the 
rigidified  definite  description.  A  possible  response  on  behalf  of  Jackson  denies  that  such 
idiosyncratic  metaphysical  opinions of the speaker constitute his  understanding of the term but 
more basic and universally shared '[...] principles of theory choice [...]'  (438). Nevertheless, any 
specification of this  vague suggestion is  refuted by further  cases.  More important,  though,  this 
response is flawed by origin, as it questions the value of knowing A-intensions.
Finally,  the uniqueness  clause of  the  description  is  challenged by counterexamples,  too. 
Since salt well might be a mixture of NaCl and AbCd, associating a definite description, rigidified 
or no, with the term 'salt'  is fallible [Block & Stalnaker, 1999, 18]. In response, Jackson could 
switch  to  a  partial  definition  of  'salt'  where  two  different  but  each  again  definite  rigidified 
descriptions make up the respective  A-intension [Block & Stalnaker, 1999, 21], [Schroeter, 2003, 
4 ]. This, however, attributes overly strong cognitive capacities to speakers, as they are supposed to 
disambiguate  infallibly  the  diverse  meanings  of  natural  kind  terms.  Alternatively,  it  might  be 
suggested that the rigidified description merely captures the functional role independently of what 
salt consists of at the single worlds. Again, though, this move trivialises description.
To sum up these  inquests,  two-dimensional  descriptivism falls  prey to  a  dilemma when 
confronted with externalist counterexamples: Either it generalises the descriptions which speakers 
are supposed to know  a priori such that this knowledge becomes trivial, or it  enhances them to 
capture any far-fetched cases such that knowledge of them exceeds what can reasonably assumed to 
be human cognitive capacities. Considered by itself, the assumption that speakers have an a priori 
knowledge of A-intensions thus becomes implausible.
Jackson accordingly embeds his epistemological assumptions into a more general picture of 
language and communication. He sketches it in different ways [Jackson, 1994, 34][Jackson, 1998b, 
202][Jackson, 2009, 391, 423f.], but essentially it amounts to three claims [Jackson, 2004, 266f]. 
First,  he  understands  languages  as  sets  of  items  by  means  of  which  a  transmitter  conveys 
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information to receivers.  This requires both to associate  with these linguistic elements possible 
ways things are. Second, among these associations needs to be a class of such which remain stable 
across hypothetical cases of application. Third, these associations are built into the meaning of the 
terms such that being a competent speaker suffices to know them. By an argument to the best 
explanation Jackson identifies these stable and a priori knowable associations with his A-intensions.
Admittedly, this picture provides Jackson's assumption of a priori knowledge of A-intensions 
with some plausibility.  Nevertheless, this achievement turns out to be merely apparent,  because 
Jackson's view on language and communication is by no means less controversial than the claim to 
a priority itself.
Various arguments have been raised in the literature, but for reasons of brevity I focus on a 
already known opponent of Jackson's case. Schroeter casts doubt on argument from language by 
proposing  an  alternative  model  of  communication.  It  dispenses  with  any  core  set  of  resilient 
assumptions about the extension of 'F', instead, the folk theory about Fs is continuously developed, 
changed and adjusted [Schroeter, 2006, 572]. Still, it can account for the difference between change 
of belief and change in meaning as well as for synonymy, since meaning is solidified by holistic, 
rationalising interpretations speakers undertake of their own linguistic practise. This 'jazz model' of 
communication [Schroeter  & Bigelow,  2009,  102]  is  not  only more  economical  than Jackson's 
account as it reduces linguistic competence to general heuristic abilities, it also captures better the 
psychological reality. And it does so without any commitment to speakers associating with a term a 
resilient class of properties which could be identified with A-intensions. Hence, Jackson's account is 
not  the  best  explanation  of  language  and  communication  and  therefore  fails  to  bolster  his 
descriptivism.
4. Serious metaphysics without analysis
In  the  foregoing  section,  I  have  sketched  the  various  obstacles  Jackson's  argument  faces.  The 
number of objections raised indicates how controversial his presumptions are and accordingly how 
weakly his overall argument is founded. To establish that only analysis allows the metaphysician to 
solve her placement problems, he commits himself not merely to a two-dimensional semantics for 
natural kind terms but to a full-blooded descriptivist theory of reference. As these indeed are strong, 
though contentious theories, he gets  hold of a powerful philosophical machinery.  It is therefore 
hardly  surprising  that  based  on  these  assumptions  he  arrives  at  the  envisaged  conclusion  that 
speakers have a priori knowledge about the reference of natural kind terms.
Simultaneously, however, he inherits all the problems of these positions. Thus, his argument 
becomes considerably vulnerable, at more than one point.  If only some of the objections above 
hold, Jackson's argument fails to show that analysis is essential for serious metaphysics. In any case, 
however, one has to admit that Jackson's argument rests on highly controversial claims.
It might be replied that hardly any philosophical argument is free of objections and that 
contentious assumptions do not yet disqualify the overall  project.  Instead, its value ought to be 
measured not so much according to its costs but according to the theoretical benefits it promises. 
The issue Jackson has started from, the need of serious metaphysics to identify entailment relations 
between theoretical and commonplace truths, is indubitably both relevant and urgent. Therefore, it 
might be argued, Jackson's argument can still be maintained as a valuable contribution and has to be 
considered seriously.  This defence of Jackson's argument only holds, however,  if  no alternative 
solution for placement problems stands to reason.
In a series of articles [Kirk, 1996], [Kirk, 2001], [Kirk, 2006a] Robert Kirk addresses in an 
initially congenial way the commitments of serious metaphysics. As Jackson, Kirk argues that the 
global  supervenience  thesis  which  a  serious  metaphysical  theory  is  equivalent  to,  compels  the 
theorist to identify entailment relations between theoretical truths such as (1) and commonplace 
truths like (2). Since metaphysical entailment would not suffice (page 1), she needs to establish 
strict implication instead, such that the conditional '(1) → (2)' becomes a necessary truth.
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Kirk and Jackson disagree, however, about which necessity is required. Whereas Jackson 
contrasts  a posteriori with  a priori necessity and thus gives analysis a prominent place (page 1), 
Kirk champions logical necessity [Kirk, 2006b, 529]. For the exemplary theoretical  truth (1) to 
strictly imply the commonplace (2),  the conditional '(1)  → (2)'  must  be necessary thus that its 
negation '(1) ^ :(2)' is inconsistent [Kirk, 1996, 244], [Kirk, 2006b, 544] [Kirk, 2006b, 527]. In the 
remainder of this paper, I shall elaborate Kirk's approach and sketch an argument why this different 
conception of necessity offers an alternative route for entry by entailment which does not require a 
priori knowledge and therefore is not committed to any descriptivism.
To forestall misunderstandings, strict implication (hereafter: SI) covers a priori entailment if 
there is such. The inconsistency might be of a kind that analysis indeed yields a priori knowledge of 
the conditional. The crucial difference, however, is that SI can dispense with it. Jackson suggests 
that if merely metaphysical necessities do not suffice a priori knowable sentences make up the only 
strengthening available. I deny this dichotomy. There are sentences, and '(1) → (2)' is one of them, 
which are logically necessary but still not knowable a priori. This is so, because conceivability is 
not necessary for consistency. For any circle's circumference c and diameter d, px = c 
is necessarily  true.  Nonetheless,  x  =  cd  ^  x =2  Q  is  conceivable,  as speakers might grasp the 
concept of the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter and still not  know that  pi  is not a 
rational number [Kirk, 2006a, 533]. Generally, there are strict implications such that it is impossible 
for speakers to proceed a priori from knowledge of the antecedent to knowledge of the consequent. 
Therefore SI does not presuppose a priori entailment.
One might deny SI being a valuable alternative since the strict, but a posteriori implication 
'(1)  → (2)' would fail to explain the step from (1) to (2) (page 1). I counter that the consistency 
necessary for '(1) → (2)' being a strict implication corresponds to a proof, that is a complete unit of 
explicit reasoning leading from (1) to (2). In fact, this may well be the very same reasoning as given 
above as an example for  a priori entailment. SI therefore has the same explanatory potential as 
Jackson's  a  priori  entailment,  the only difference is  that  SI does not  require  (3')  to be  a  priori 
knowable.  Still,  doubts  might  be  raised  based  on  the  concern  that  such  an  account  would 
presuppose and be committed to a certain calculus. However, the consistency at issue need not be 
proved in a formal system. Informal reasoning suffices to justify strict implication.
It  might  still  be  objected  that  SI  eventually  collapses  into  a  posteriori entailment.  If  p 
implicates q strictly, it would be argued, such that the conditional                 is provable 
and completeness holds for T then is also true in all models                    ,which would 
mean nothing more than being true at all worlds. As this, however, is already given by superT (page 
1), SI would beg the question and the metaphysicist would be where she started from.
This line of thought, however, goes wrong since it confuses models with possible worlds and 
therefore model-theoretic with metaphysical necessity. At best, a possible world may count as the 
domain of a model, which, though, still contains in addition its interpretation function which maps 
non-logical expressions into the domain. Therefore, if  ╞ p, then  p is true merely in virtue of its 
logical  form,  independent  of  its  meaning.  Truth  in  possible  worlds,  on the  contrary,  applies  to 
interpreted sentences, such that if  ╟  p, then  p is true because of what it says is the case at any 
possible world. Accordingly, ╟  p is not sufficient for╞  p, as p's truth may depend on its meaning. 
Hence, model-theoretic necessity is by far a stronger notion than metaphysical necessity, and SI 
does not beg the question.
In  conclusion,  SI  is  not  committed  to  the  two-dimensional  descriptivism  Jackson  has 
developed in support of his a priori entailment. Accordingly, the various objections raised above do 
not  apply.  Nonetheless,  SI  gives  a  sufficient  answer  to  the  placement  problems  of  serious 
metaphysics. In view of its serious and diverse difficulties and the availability of an alternative I 
conclude that Jackson fails to show why analysis should play an essential role in metaphysics.
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